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n China’s Shantung (Shandong) Province at the end of the nineteenth century, 
xenophobic bandits known as Boxers emerged, and violence against foreigners 
and Christians increased� Ministers representing foreign countries in Peking 
(Beijing) complained to the Qing court and requested that warships be deployed 
to protect their nationals�1 At that point a matter that had begun as terroristic at-
tacks by bandits became a conflict between the na-
tions involved: the Qing government declared war 
against foreign powers� The military operations 
that the foreign states—which included Japan, a 
newly emerging Asian power—conducted during 
this war were the first coalition operations of the 
modern era�2
On June 5, 1900, Vice Admiral Edward Sey-
mour, Royal Navy, Commander in Chief, British 
China Squadron, the senior naval officer present 
in the port of Taku (Dagu), took the initiative� He 
assembled a council of the naval commanders of 
the foreign powers represented in Taku on board 
his flagship, with the aim of achieving concerted 
action�3 Between then and October 25, twenty-
seven such councils convened�4 The senior naval 
officers of all the foreign powers with ships in Taku 
composed the membership� Councils assembled 
I
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on an ad hoc basis and functioned as the supreme consultative body for the 
commanders�
Historical analysts assess that “on the whole, this consensual method worked 
well�”5 By way of contrast, the theater commanders who led the army forces that 
the foreign powers deployed to conduct the ground campaigns assembled only 
at the most crucial point during their pursuit of the ultimate goal, which was to 
rescue the diplomatic corps in Peking� Naval commanders, by assembling the 
Council of Senior Naval Commanders periodically throughout all phases from 
the outset of the uprising to the end of major operations, ensured that coalition 
operations were conducted smoothly� Because the naval councils were the sole 
mechanism for command and coordination of the coalition forces, they shaped 
the course of not only naval operations but all military activities that the foreign 
powers conducted during the war�
Today’s Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, as part of the global war on terrorism, 
which broke out in 2001, has become the largest example of coalition warfare at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century—one hundred years after the foreign 
response to the Boxer Rebellion represented the first coalition warfare of the 
twentieth century�6 In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, U�S� armed forces have created 
a model of command and coordination for coalition warfare�7 Joint publications 
governing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM provide for parallel command struc-
tures, with no single force commander designated—which was the case during the 
Boxer Rebellion as well�8 However, the leadership of any coalition must develop 
a means of coordinating among the participants to attain unity of effort, so em-
ploying some coordination center is essential�9 The Council of Senior Naval Com-
manders worked so well during the Boxer Rebellion because it served as the mul-
tinational coordination center for the commanders of the foreign navies present�
This article examines the roles the Council of Senior Naval Commanders 
played during the Boxer Rebellion throughout the conflict’s phases—with that 
role changing on the basis of the nature of the particular challenge at hand—and 
how these councils contributed to the smooth coordination of coalition warfare� 
The most important supporting documentary reference is the official naval rec-
ord edited by the Kaigun Daijin Kanbo (Office of the Minister of the Navy), Meiji 
33 Nen Shinkoku Jihen Kaigun Senshishou Kan 1–5 (Naval History of the Northern 
Qing Incident in 1900), which contains all the documents regarding the twenty-
seven councils, including minutes of their deliberations, Japanese translations 
thereof, reports of the participants, and the related orders submitted by the re-
spective authorities� (The numbering of the councils from first to twenty-seventh 
is in accordance with this document�)
For the sake of convenience in discussing similar items with regard to each 
council, the article divides the period of the Boxer Rebellion into four phases� To 
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organize examination 
of the discussions and 
resolutions of each 
council meeting, the 
analysis identifies the 
foremost feature of 
each phase� In doing 
so it takes into con-
sideration the diplo-
matic relationships 
among the foreign 
powers, the situation 
on the ground among 
the fighting armies, 
and the activities of 
Admiral Seymour as 
senior commander 
of the foreign navies 
and the central figure 
of the naval coalition�
P h a s e  1  c ov e r s 
the period from the 
outset of the Boxer 
Rebellion to Seymour’s landing in command of the marines that the coalition na-
vies supplied to move on Peking� During this phase the naval commanders of the 
foreign powers present established the coalition and set its course� Phase 2 covers 
Seymour’s return to Tientsin (Tianjin) following his failed expedition against Pe-
king, during which the coalition navies supported the expedition� Phase 3 begins 
with the shift of the ground campaigns from bluejackets to soldiers and ends with 
the relief of Peking� By this phase, the objectives of the foreign powers had be-
come more complex and the objectives of the naval coalition therefore more dif-
fused� Phase 4 marks the period during which the coalition navies planned and 
executed operations for occupying Shanhaikwan (Shanhaiguan) and Chinwang-
tao (Qinhuangdao) to maintain coalition communications during the winter�
PHASE 1: ESTABLISHING THE COALITION AND  
SETTING ITS COURSE
Since a British priest had become the first victim of the most recent bout of Chi-
nese xenophobia in 1899, the Boxers repeatedly had attacked Christian churches 
and killed foreigners� On May 28, 1900, when the Boxers destroyed a train station 
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in a suburb of Peking, the ministers of the foreign powers in the capital requested 
the deployment of marines to protect the embassies, and warships of the foreign 
powers started arriving off Taku� By June 2 the foreign navies with ships in the 
vicinity of China had sent 442 marines to Peking� Seymour arrived off Taku on 
June 1 and went ashore on the 3rd to inspect the Tientsin area�10
As the senior naval officer present, Seymour believed he should initiate any 
action� He consulted Rear Admiral Charles Courrejolles of the French navy, the 
next-most-senior naval officer present, who suggested that Seymour convene a 
council on his flagship� The immediate aim was to inform the other naval repre-
sentatives of the request for relief from the ministers in Peking� Seymour issued 
the following invitation to the commanders�
In view of the gravity of affairs at Peking and its neighbourhood, and the possibility 
of all communication being cut off by the “Boxers” between the Capital and Tien-
tsin, leaving our respective Ministers isolated and unable to communicate with their 
Government or with us in this anchorage; it seems to me desirable that the respective 
Senior Officer of the Ships of War present here (except the Chinese) should meet to-
gether to consider the situation� As I happen to be the Senior Naval Officer present I 
therefore take on myself to have the honour of putting the above question before you; 
and should you agree I would suggest you might assemble on board this ship at  
4 p�m� to-day for the above purpose�
On the 5th, Seymour assembled the first Council of Senior Naval Command-
ers of the foreign powers on board his flagship, Centurion�11 This action repre-
sented the very outset of the formation of a coalition: the consolidation of twenty-
five ships, from eight navies, that happened to be present off Taku� It marked the 
beginning of a series of twenty-seven Councils of Senior Naval Commanders� 
Seymour had no authority to command or control the foreign navies, and the 
humble wording of the invitation letter implies the difficulty of his position� At 
the first council, in addition to Seymour, the participants were Rear Admirals 
Courrejolles of France, Vesselago of Russia, and Kempff of the United States and 
Captains Guelig of Germany, Casella of Italy, and Nagamine of Japan� In addi-
tion, a commander represented Captain Montalmar of Austria, as he would at the 
second and third councils as well�
At the first council, the participants agreed to points as follows: 
• The purpose of the coalition was to protect the lives and properties of their 
countrymen via a peaceful and defensive mission, which in no way was 
directed against the Chinese government�
• Actions of the coalition should be taken according to the desires and with 
the consent of the ministers, and it behooved the commanders to act in 
concert�
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• If the ministers in Peking were isolated and communicating with them was 
impossible, and if time permitted, the commanders should consult their 
superior naval authorities�
• If affairs were so serious and urgent that time did not permit such consulta-
tion, the commanders should consult with each other and act without further 
consultation with authorities�12
At the second council, on the 6th, Seymour presented a telegram from the 
British minister at Peking asking, as the collective will of the diplomatic corps, 
that, should railway and telegraph lines be cut and Peking besieged, the com-
manders off Taku would consult with one another and march to the ministers’ 
relief� The commanders discussed the matter and decided on a concept for de-
ploying their embarked marines, as follows:13
• Command and control: While different foreign guards should consult their 
own consuls with regard to the protection of their consulates in Tientsin, if 
combined forces made an advance on Peking there would need to be a single 
officer in command� Seymour asked the participants to consider whether 
an officer should be nominated to command the forces, and if so who that 
officer should be�
• Rules of engagement: In his telegram, the British minister strongly urged 
that permission be granted for the guards to respond to hostility with active 
measures� The only comment on or response to this request from the Brit-
ish minister came from the U�S� Navy’s Admiral Kempff, who stated that 
if the Chinese attacked the guards who were protecting lives and proper-
ties and keeping communications open with Peking, they must accept the 
consequences� 
While the ministers were taking an active line with regard to the possibility 
of military engagement, the naval commanders’ approach seems generally re-
strained; the missions of the deploying marines were to protect lives and property 
and restore communications with Peking�14
The first and second councils were conducted with no prearranged format to 
the meetings—there was no time for the participants to prepare� However, dur-
ing the second council it was agreed that if anyone received a dispatch containing 
news of great importance he should send it to Seymour so that, if necessary, the 
Council of Senior Naval Commanders might be convened� The participants also 
agreed that the senior naval officer present should preside over each meeting, 
meaning that if Seymour should be absent from Taku the next-most-senior naval 
commander present would preside�15
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The ministers in Peking recognized on the 8th that the Chinese governmental 
forces had no intention of defending Peking from the Boxers� Seymour decided 
to send marines to Tientsin to augment its defenses and announced his intent to 
the other naval commanders at the third council, which took place on the 9th� 
The French and Russian commanders proposed that a request be submitted to 
the Chinese government to suppress the rebels, but Vice Admiral Bendemann of 
Germany, attending the council for the first time, stated that the German govern-
ment had directed him to consult with the other powers on how best to relieve the 
ministers; he argued that anything beyond that was the province of the diplomats 
in Peking� The French-Russian proposal was denied� This indicates that the naval 
commanders considered the province of the council to be military affairs only, 
staying out of diplomacy�16
After the conclusion of the third council, Seymour received a message of alarm 
from the British minister in Peking� The admiral sent a letter to Captain Naga-
mine of Japan, commanding officer of Kasagi, in which he argued that time was 
limited� Seymour therefore requested commencement of a combined action, for 
which Seymour planned to land as many forces as possible immediately and take 
command himself�17 Seymour took this precipitate action not only because speed 
was paramount but also because the perceived risk in taking military action was 
low, as the enemy was considered to be mere bandits�18
An additional consideration was that by taking action the British government 
could forestall Russian occupation of the territory around Peking, as well as the 
railway in northern China�19 This consideration vis-à-vis Russia may have been 
an important factor, as demonstrated by the fact that Seymour communicated 
his critical decision—to land forces and take direct command—only to Japan, 
without convening the council�
As reasons why coalition operations were executed smoothly under the aus-
pices of the Council of Senior Naval Commanders, despite the fact that the coali-
tion contained, within its eight powers, nations in competition with each other 
(e�g�, Japan versus Russia, France versus Germany), Eric Ouellet offers four, as 
follows: Seymour, the senior commander, was from the Royal Navy, which was 
the world’s leading navy; all the commanders shared a sense of urgency; the pow-
ers believed it would be easy to suppress the Boxers; and all the powers sought to 
expand their influence in China�20
The theme of the initial three councils, comprising Phase 1, was how to deal 
with the crisis unfolding in Peking, and the powers—despite their diverse dip-
lomatic calculations—framed an initial posture concentrated on relieving the 
besieged diplomatic corps� Seymour believed that if the commanders had no time 
to confer with their home authorities, it was most important that they consult as 
a body� Thereafter the Council of Senior Naval Commanders was considered the 
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supreme decision-making body among the powers fighting against the Boxers 
in theater� A corroborating fact is that when the diplomats in Peking sent their 
telegraph beseeching that “should this (the siege of Peking) happen we beg im-
mediate instructions be sent to Officers commanding Squadrons Taku to consult 
together and march to our relief,” it was sent to the naval commanders� This 
indicates that the diplomats approved the Council of Senior Naval Commanders 
functioning as the supreme decision-making body at the outset of the incident�
The diplomatic position of each power vis-à-vis China varied, depending 
on the respective governmental policy� Britain intended to maintain the status 
quo—preventing Russia from taking advantage of the Boxers’ uprising—while 
other powers swarmed over China seeking to extract concessions over finance, 
trade, and territory�21 In this international environment, the Councils of Senior 
Naval Commanders held during Phase 1 played the role of determining the stra-
tegic course of action of the coalition, as well as functioning as a body of liaison 
and coordination, and even of decision-making to execute military operations�
PHASE 2: SUPPORTING SEYMOUR’S EXPEDITION
As soon as Seymour landed on June 10 he began leading the coalition forces 
composed of marines on their march toward Peking� On the same day, commu-
nications between Peking and Tientsin were cut� On the evening of the 11th, the 
first armed engagement against the Boxers occurred, and the railway between 
the coalition forces and Tientsin was cut� Vice Admiral Hiltebrandt of Russia, 
the senior commander present in Taku, was informed that the Boxers were ap-
proaching Taku to occupy the train station and destroy the railway and were con-
templating mining the mouth of the Peiho (Hai) River� Hiltebrandt convened the 
fourth council on the evening of the 15th aboard his flagship, Russia� The council 
decided to direct the commanding officers of the gunboats anchored in the Peiho 
to protect the railway station and the trains but not to take any offensive action 
initially; however, if the Chinese forces attempted to occupy the railway station 
the naval forces were to attack, first at the station, then at the fort�22
On the morning of the 16th, the fifth council convened aboard Russia� The 
commanders judged that the minelaying that had been conducted at the mouth 
of the Peiho demonstrated the will of the Chinese government to cut the trans-
portation link from Peking and Tientsin to Taku� The commanders off Taku 
needed to maintain their communications with Seymour’s force, so they could 
not overlook the danger of an attack from the fort at Taku� The commanders de-
cided to propose that the Chinese evacuate the fort, and if this was not accepted 
they would occupy the fort by force� They set a deadline of 2 AM the next day� 
However, Admiral Kempff rejected the proposal and refused to sign the minutes, 
believing that an attack on the fort could lead to war with the Qing government� 
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Thereafter the coalition forces attacked the fort at Taku and occupied it after a 
fight of a few hours�23
Immediately after the occupation of the fort on the 17th, the sixth council was 
held aboard Russia� The commanders discussed how to dispose of the Chinese 
ship Hai Yung that was anchored in the harbor�24 Inviting Admiral Yeh of the 
Chinese Navy aboard, they directed Yeh to forbid the departure of the ship; he 
agreed to do so, albeit unwillingly�25 Kempff was waiting for instructions from 
his government, and left the council before its adjournment without signing the 
minutes�26
Seymour wrote in his memoir that, although he had been absent at the time 
and thus was not in a position to comment authoritatively, he felt that it had been 
necessary for the commanders off Taku to make a judgment without him and 
that under the circumstances occupying the fort at Taku was the right decision�27 
However, subsequently the conservative faction in the Qing court took advantage 
of the coalition navies’ attack on the fort to declare war against the powers, with 
the empress dowager issuing a proclamation to that effect�28
The seventh council took place aboard Russia on the 20th� The commanders 
resolved to notify Chinese governmental officials that the purpose of coalition 
military operations was to relieve their nationals in Peking, and that their targets 
were the bandits who were hindering that aim�29 However, heavy resistance by 
both the Boxers and Qing forces halted all advance by Seymour’s force on the 
18th, and the marines started retreating to Tientsin on the 19th� The coalition 
forces set up defenses around the city while their opponents closed in� On the 
23rd, augmenting army forces broke through the encircling net around Tientsin 
and succeeded in contacting Seymour and his marines�
On the same day, the naval commanders convened the eighth council, again 
on Russia, and discussed a request received from the senior consul general in 
Shanghai, in the south of China, for the protection of foreign nationals there�30 
The commanders deemed that no ship was available to allocate to Shanghai while 
the crisis was still going on in northern China, especially since the situation in the 
south was still relatively calm� This council also agreed that Admiral Vesselago 
of Russia would assume command of the forts and gunboats in the Peiho River, 
while Lieutenant Commander Wise, USN, was appointed commander of forces 
at the Tongku (Tanggu) railway station near Taku�
Admiral Togo of Japan, who had arrived at Taku the day before, attended this 
eighth council� To finesse the issue of seniority, thereafter Rear Admiral Dewa 
attended almost all councils on behalf of Togo�31
Following the failure of Seymour’s expedition, the coalition marine forces fi-
nally returned to Taku on the 26th� Any further relief operation was postponed 
until additional army forces arrived to augment the marines� Japan, as the 
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power located closest to northern China, was expected to send a good number 
of soldiers�32
The term of the Seymour expedition coincided almost exactly with that of 
Phase 2� During this phase the senior naval commanders used the councils to 
discuss how to support Seymour’s force and how to break the encirclement of 
Tientsin, including by their attack on the fort at Taku� The councils were not the 
venue by which to exercise tactical command over the attack on the fort; how-
ever, it was the strategic decisions the councils made, especially to attack the fort, 
that changed the nature of the struggle from the suppression of bandits to a war 
against China, even if this development was unintended�
Although northern China remained the focal area, the Yangtze River area, 
which included Shanghai, had become an additional area of interest for some 
coalition nations� One reason advanced for this is that the diplomatic priority for 
Britain—the most important actor in the coalition—was to maintain its national 
interests in the Far East in general, with the specific issues at stake in Peking and 
with regard to the Qing dynasty being of secondary importance�33 Separately, the 
British government had ordered its deputy consul general in Shanghai to build a 
cooperative relationship with the Chinese viceroys there, and the Admiralty had 
ordered the China Squadron to take measures sufficient to protect the lives and 
property of British nationals along the Yangtze River� This demonstrated the gov-
ernment’s great interest in southern China—and that maintaining those interests 
was even more important than the relief of Peking�34
PHASE 3: DIFFUSION OF COALITION OBJECTIVES
While he was in Tientsin Seymour sent a letter to Rear Admiral Bruce, the next- 
most-senior RN officer off Taku, directing him to request that Japan augment 
the coalition forces in response to reinforcement by the enemy� The senior naval 
commanders convened the ninth council on Russia and decided to ask Japan for 
an army division, and that they would conduct boardings to prevent ammunition 
and military equipment from flowing into northern China�
In his letter Seymour also requested consultations about the situation in 
Shanghai, at the Woosung (Wusong) forts, and regarding the Chinese cruisers 
and other ships in that area; however, there is no evidence the commanders dis-
cussed these subjects at the council� One might presume that this was because 
they already had made a decision regarding the Shanghai area at the eighth 
council� But Seymour’s attempt to swing the discussion over to Shanghai served 
to demonstrate the magnitude of British interests in southern China� Britain real-
ized an immense profit from the enormous commercial network it had formed 
in the south around the Yangtze River, and the British government was very keen 
to maintain order in the Shanghai area�35 On June 27, the consuls general of the 
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powers in Shanghai concluded an agreement with the viceroys there to maintain 
order in southern China, with the viceroys attesting to their desire for peace, 
including no confrontations with foreign powers�36
The tenth council, held on July 7 aboard Russia, convened at the request of 
Admiral Kempff, whom Washington had directed to ask the coalition navies’ col-
lective opinion regarding how many soldiers it would require to relieve Peking� 
At the eleventh council, convened on the 8th, again on Russia, the execution 
of boardings of merchant ships sailing under the flags of the council members’ 
nations, which already had been discussed at the ninth council, was the theme�
Seymour returned to his flagship, Centurion, on the 12th, fresh from complet-
ing a plan to capture Tientsin that had been produced with the army command-
ers of the forces of Japan, the United States, and France�37 The attack on Tientsin 
took place the next day and the city was liberated on the 14th� Seymour convened 
the twelfth council on July 13 on Centurion, with Admiral Togo participating� It 
had been more than a month since Seymour last presided over the council� The 
body resolved to order the consuls to conduct boardings to enforce the embargo 
against weapons and ammunition flowing into China� Even though the attack 
on Tientsin commenced that day, the only issue relating to the ground campaign 
discussed was a proposal to request that the Japanese army take the initiative in 
the defense of the fort at Taku�
On the 16th, the army commanders of the foreign powers gathered at the 
Tientsin headquarters of Lieutenant General Alekseyev of Russia and discussed 
the governance of the city� On the same day, in response to a request from Alek-
seyev, Seymour convened the thirteenth council aboard Centurion (with Togo 
again in attendance) to discuss the management of the railway between Tongku 
and Tientsin� It was resolved by majority vote, with Britain and the United States 
opposed, that management of the line should be placed in the hands of Russia, 
which would assume the responsibility to guard it, with the reservation that the 
railway would be returned to the former administration as soon as military cir-
cumstances permitted� Having taken this action, the Coalition Transportation 
Committee, which had been established at the eighth council, was dissolved�
Admiral Seymour and Major General Gaselee, commander of British army 
forces, were dissatisfied with this conclusion; they thought that the matter of 
the railway’s operation should not be decided by the fleet alone� It was true that 
the Russians in actuality were already in charge of maintaining and protecting 
the railway; that the Coalition Transportation Committee was then the only 
organization authorized to delegate railway management; and that the senior of-
ficer of that committee was Russian� Yet given that it was the eighth council that 
had granted the committee its authority, it would have been appropriate for any 
amendment of that agreement also to be discussed and resolved by the council� 
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That, presumably, is why General Alekseyev had requested that the council 
convene� This episode illustrates that the nature of the Council of Senior Naval 
Commanders had changed by this stage, with the core concern shifting to the 
relief of Peking by army forces�
On the 23rd Seymour left Taku, cruising south with his flag in Alacrity, arriv-
ing at Shanghai on the 26th� On the 24th, Hiltebrandt convened the fourteenth 
council aboard Russia, at Bendemann’s request� Berlin had directed Bendemann 
to propose a discussion of the blockade of the Chinese fleet in the Yangtze River 
and measures to prevent the Chinese from reinforcing the forts along the Chinese 
coastline� The commanders decided to send a letter to Seymour, who was then 
en route to the south, and the naval commanders in the Yangtze area to dictate 
to the local Chinese authorities that there was to be no departure by the Chinese 
fleet from the Yangtze River and no reinforcement of the coastal forts�38 In his 
letter of response dated August 6, Seymour would write that such a request was 
inappropriate at that time�39
Also at the fourteenth council, the commanders discussed the earliest possible 
relief of the diplomatic corps in Peking� It also resolved to request that the viceroy 
in Shantung send a letter to the Tsungli-Yamen (Zongli Yamen) (the government 
body in charge of foreign policy in imperial China) requesting that a letter be 
produced signed by the ministers themselves, to prove they were safe�40
On the 27th, Seymour handed command of all British forces over to General 
Gaselee� Lieutenant General Linevich arrived as commander of Russian forces 
on the 31st� The commanders of the ground forces of all eight foreign powers 
convened on August 4� With this, the ground forces were being reinforced, a 
leadership structure was being consolidated over them, and a concrete plan for 
the relief of Peking was being prepared� On the 28th in Shanghai, the consuls 
general resolved to entrust the protection of the foreign settlement there to the 
naval ships of the foreign powers anchored in Shanghai� Seymour, who was in 
Shanghai, accepted the new charge�
Back in Taku, Hiltebrandt convened the fifteenth council on August 2� The 
commanders applied themselves only to a purely practical business issue: they 
discussed and agreed on the landing point of undersea cables that were being 
laid from Chifu (Yantai), which lay across the Gulf of Chihli (Bohai Sea) to the 
southeast�
On the 5th—the day the ground forces started marching on Peking— 
Hiltebrandt convened the sixteenth council� He proposed to notify Seymour to 
direct the commanding officers of coalition navy ships in Shanghai to halt the 
departure of Chinese warships, a step with which all the commanders off Taku 
agreed� Seymour, however, sent a letter, dated the 19th, in which he wrote that he 
was unable to give orders to Chinese warships� Instead he notified the Chinese 
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that they should inform the consuls general of the purpose of any departure by 
Chinese warships, so that any misunderstanding by coalition navy commanders 
could be avoided�
During this period Seymour acted as the senior naval commander in Shang-
hai, and through a second council of senior naval commanders there he exerted 
his influence among the powers� As early as July 3 the British Admiralty already 
had notified Seymour of the shift of command authority over military opera-
tions in China from him to Gaselee, so Seymour could concentrate his efforts 
on activities intended to maintain British interests in southern China without 
worrying about the operation to relieve Peking� Therefore, even though the op-
eration to relieve Peking was still going on, he cruised south on July 23 and met 
the viceroy in Nanking (Nanjing)� His intent was to confirm for himself whether 
the China Squadron could shift its focus to southern China once Gaselee’s army 
forces were launched into northern China�41 Following his consultations with 
Chinese officials in southern China, on August 18—when the relief of Peking had 
been completed—Britain landed two thousand troops in the south, on its own 
discretion�42 Seymour’s denial of restrictions on the ability of the Chinese fleet to 
maneuver—contrary to the resolution of the sixteenth council in Taku—makes it 
quite clear that Seymour’s activities in southern China were aimed at protecting 
British national interests in that area, regardless of whether Peking was relieved�
Russian interests in Manchuria started to suffer damage at the end of June� In 
response, the Russian emperor approved the deployment of forces to Manchu-
ria, and battles began to occur in various places� Like Britain, Russia prioritized 
protection of its national interests, in its case in Manchuria, ahead of the relief of 
Peking, which likely weakened the Russian will to invade the city�43 On the other 
hand, since Russia had no direct interest in southern China, it must have looked 
favorably on the competition among foreign powers in that region, as it might 
divert the attention of the other powers away from northern China�
Off Taku on August 10, Admiral Courrejolles presided over the seventeenth 
council aboard D’Entrecasteaux� The commanders again discussed a purely 
practical business matter, having to do with a contract with a civilian company 
regarding a lighthouse boat�44
Peking was relieved on August 14� On the 23rd, Rear Admiral Candiani of 
Italy presided over the eighteenth council on Fieramosca� Matters discussed were 
how to handle contributions received for the men wounded, asking Rear Admiral 
Dewa to convey a collective message of gratitude from the coalition to the gov-
ernment of Japan for the Japanese treatment of the wounded men, and how to 
deliver messages that arrived via the submarine cable that had opened just two 
days before�45
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The fourth through eighteenth councils used French as their official language, 
and minutes were recorded in that language�46 This probably was because Hilte-
brandt did not speak English�47 By contrast, almost all the senior officers were 
proficient in French, as it was common for people from the upper echelons of 
European societies, from which most senior officers were drawn, to learn French� 
In modern coalition operations as well, language differences within a multina-
tional force can present a real challenge to command and control, efficient com-
munications, and unity of effort� From a tactical and an operational perspective, 
proficiency in French influenced the cohesion of the 1900 coalition positively�48
In Phase 3 the major action shifted away from the navies to the armies, and 
the primary focus of the coalition became the planning and implementation of 
a ground campaign springboarding from the capture of Tientsin to the relief of 
Peking� As was seen in the record of the ninth council, at which the request for 
Japan to deploy an army division for the relief of Peking was resolved, the com-
manders (unanimously) participated in that strategic decision made early in 
Phase 3�
In contrast, it is worth noting that Britain and Russia—two major actors in 
China—acted more for their own important interests than for the relief of Peking, 
which was the initial common goal of the coalition� On completion of the relief, 
the foreign powers started acting unilaterally to build a new order in China—
prioritizing their own interests�49 During the latter stages of this phase the focal 
points of discussion in the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders became un-
settled, and the role of the council became unclear�
PHASE 4: EXECUTING OPERATIONS IN SHANHAIKWAN AND 
CHINWANGTAO
Once Peking was subjugated, the withdrawal of troops started taking place in 
September� Marshal Waldersee of Germany, the commander in chief of coali-
tion forces, arrived in Taku on the 25th� On the 27th, Seymour convened the 
nineteenth council aboard Alacrity in response to a request from Bendemann� 
Bendemann introduced Waldersee’s contention that occupation of Chinwangtao 
was necessary to maintain transport connections during the winter, and that the 
navy should conduct the operation�50 The senior naval commanders agreed to 
this proposal, except that Rear Admiral Skrydroff of Russia reserved comment, 
as he had no instructions from General Alekseyev� Two days later, on the 29th, 
the twentieth council discussed the details of the operation� Seymour would take 
overall command of the operation in Chinwangtao, and an anchoring plan was 
decided on� No American representative attended the twentieth council—in fact, 
the United States did not send anyone to any of the remaining councils—and the 
United States did not participate in the Shanhaikwan operation�
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On the 30th, Seymour presided over the twenty-first council� The command-
ers decided that the expedition would depart for Shanhaikwan on October 2� 
This council settled the tactical details of the operation, including the allocation 
of forces, the order of march, and reporting procedures� In comparison with 
most of the other councils, this one was more tactical and operational, aimed at 
conducting a specific campaign; it was most similar to the council that preceded 
the capture of the fort at Taku�
Meanwhile, Walter Hillier, a former British diplomat who had been stationed 
in Peking, voluntarily proceeded to Shanhaikwan aboard the British gunboat 
Pigmy to recommend surrender to the Chinese� Surprisingly, the Chinese com-
mander in Shanhaikwan followed this advice and evacuated the forts with no 
conditions� By the time the coalition forces landed at Shanhaikwan the Chinese 
troops already had completed their evacuation, so the forts were reoccupied 
without any conflict� At the twenty-second council, on October 1 aboard Centu-
rion in Taku, Seymour notified the participants of the reports from Pigmy, and 
the council resolved that the national flags of the seven countries involved should 
be hoisted and that the commanders should land at 7 AM on October 2 to fix the 
location of the flags�51 Then Admiral Skrydroff shocked the other participants by 
declaring that, because Shanhaikwan was at the left front of the Russian maneu-
ver area in Manchuria, it was included within the Russian sphere of influence�52
On the 2nd, the flagships of the coalition powers anchored off Shanhaikwan 
and the commanders went ashore� They gathered at Fort No� 1, made an inspec-
tion, and then convened the twenty-third council at the railway station—the 
first council held ashore� The commanders made interim decisions on which 
countries should occupy the five forts, the magazine, and the railway station and 
how to hoist the national flags, pending submission of these matters to Walder-
see for approval�53 On the 4th, Seymour presided over the twenty-fourth council 
aboard Centurion, at which it was agreed that the principal place of disembar-
kation would be at Chinwangtao and that a small jetty would be constructed at 
Shanhaikwan�
It was resolved further that the taotai (daotai) (the Chinese official in charge 
of administration and foreign diplomacy) and the principal officials of the walled 
town of Shanhaikwan were to be summoned to appear before the representatives 
of the coalition nations at Fort No� 1�54 On the 5th, the Chinese general and other 
Chinese officials presented themselves at the fort, demonstrating their submis-
sion� Thereupon the twenty-fifth council convened at the fort and drew up min-
utes of what had been discussed with the Chinese officials�55
Although the twenty-fourth council had determined by majority vote to 
build a jetty at Shanhaikwan, Rear Admiral Dewa continued to insist that it was 
possible to transport goods from the sea and unload them without the expense 
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of constructing a jetty� He sent Seymour a letter repeating his opinion, and Sey-
mour agreed to raise this issue anew at the next council�56 Accordingly, when 
the twenty-sixth council convened on the 8th aboard Centurion off Taku, the 
commanders agreed to nominate officers to a committee that would assemble at 
Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan to consider the question and advise what piers, 
if any, should be constructed at each place, where they should be positioned, and 
for whose use they should be appointed�57 The twenty-seventh council, held on 
the 15th aboard Centurion, decided to construct one pier at Chinwangtao and 
three jetties at Shanhaikwan� The council also received notification of the depar-
ture of the Chinese cruiser Hai Yung, escorted by an RN ship, to be kept under 
watch in Weihaiwei (Weihai)�58
During the first half of Phase 4 the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders 
served as naval operational planning conferences aimed at capturing Shanhai-
kwan and Chinwangtao� During the second half the commanders discussed the 
management of these two places, which the coalition fortuitously had occupied 
without bloodshed� In short, the councils of this phase almost exclusively dis-
cussed issues related to the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao operation� Thus, the 
focus of discussion in the councils of Phase 4 did not blur, as it had during Phase 
3� The primary reason was that by the early part of July Britain’s China Squad-
ron already was interested in occupying Shanhaikwan, and once the squadron 
had completed its activities in southern China, Seymour—as chairman of the 
council—could focus the council’s attention on the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao 
operation�59
Historically, navies have fulfilled a role of protecting nationals and assets endan-
gered overseas during peacetime� In the case of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the 
mission of protecting overseas nationals was regulated by the Gunkan-Gaimurei 
(Orders for Expeditionary Fleets) that the Navy Ministry had issued in 1898; 
therefore, a military operation conducted for this purpose was not considered 
“war�”60 In addition, one result of the Opium and Sino-Japanese Wars was that 
port calls by warships and the landing of marines in China by the relevant foreign 
powers, including Japan, were authorized by treaty� Therefore, at the outset of 
the Boxer Rebellion it was the navies that took the initiative, and the Council of 
Senior Naval Commanders was expected to serve as the sole coordinating body 
among the foreign powers throughout the incident�
During Phase 1, when no framework yet existed under which the representa-
tives of the eight foreign powers could discuss issues of mutual interest, Admiral 
Seymour, the senior naval officer present off Taku, proposed convening a Coun-
cil of Senior Naval Commanders, and the commanders of the foreign navies 
present agreed� The council would serve as the decision-making body to set the 
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coalition’s strategic direction, including clarifying the coalition’s purpose and 
ensuring that it acted in concert� The commanders further agreed to convene 
councils as necessary to share the latest information and make any decisions 
required� Commanders’ intent during this phase was unified�
During Phase 2—the period of the Seymour expedition—the naval coalition 
supported Seymour’s forces indirectly by capturing the fort at Taku, as well as by 
breaking through the net encircling Tientsin� The council provided the venue for 
exercising command and control�
At the council at which the commanders decided to attack the fort at Taku, the 
U�S� commander opposed the plan and did not sign the minutes, and the next day 
he carefully left the council that had been convened on completion of the capture 
of the fort before the meeting’s end so again he could avoid signing the minutes� 
The reason given was that he still was waiting for direction from his government; 
however, his behavior can be interpreted as a desire not to constrain the coalition 
from adopting its overall course of action unanimously� In this way the coalition 
could adhere to the original objective of supporting the Seymour expedition and 
maintain unity of effort�
During Phase 3 the army became the primary actor in military operations, 
and the expectations of the foreign powers began to diverge from each other� 
As a result, the focus of the councils began to blur and the role of the council 
became unclear� Nonetheless, even though four different commanders presided 
over these councils, each council continued to produce useful results, including 
the request for Japanese reinforcements, the boarding of merchant ships, the 
managing of railways, the disposal of the Chinese warships in the Yangtze River, 
and the laying of submarine cables�
Finally, during Phase 4 the councils functioned as tactical-operational confer-
ences� In this mode they conducted the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao naval opera-
tion and managed its aftermath�
In each phase the senior naval commanders of the foreign powers present act-
ed in concert—although on the basis of their own national interests—even when 
they could not communicate with their respective ministers in Peking� It was 
the coordination that the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders accomplished 
that made this “system” work, enabling them to conduct coalition operations 
smoothly� In short, the commanders were able to maintain their unity of effort, 
with the councils providing the means of coordination�
At the outset of the twenty-first century—one hundred years after the Boxer 
Rebellion—the U�S� Central Command (CENTCOM) created a coordination 
mechanism to carry out Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—another coalition 
operation—by hosting roughly four hundred liaison officers from approximately 
sixty countries at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida� The goal was to 
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create a coordination mechanism by which the U�S� commander conducting 
the operation could liaise and coordinate easily with his coalition counterparts, 
obviating the need for complex diplomatic processes�61 This unique mechanism 
provided a venue at which representatives of all participating nations were 
gathered in one place, with the United States as host� It has served its purpose 
very successfully, carrying out the liaison and coordination roles efficiently and 
effectively� In executing the war, the CENTCOM commander is the primary 
actor and the coalition partners are in position to support him� To conduct the 
administrative work, such as the business procedures for managing the coalition, 
senior national representatives (SNRs) set up an SNR Coordinating Group, with 
a chairman elected by mutual vote�62
For operations during the Boxer Rebellion, although Admiral Seymour played 
an important role, the courses of action the coalition followed were determined 
at the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders� Each council was presided over 
by a particular officer, whoever happened to be the senior naval commander 
present—not necessarily British� The business practices of the council—such as 
who would propose a council, who would chair the meeting, and what language 
would be used—were established in an ad hoc fashion, without a standing sec-
retariat� The Council of Senior Naval Commanders functioned as the unique 
mechanism for coordinating coalition operations� This council, during the first 
major coalition operation at the beginning of the twentieth century, performed 
essentially the same function that coalition operations still require in the twenty-
first century�
At the ninth council the Japanese representative was Rear Admiral Dewa, 
not Vice Admiral Togo� Togo had attended the eighth council, over which Hil-
tebrandt presided even though Togo was senior to him� Dewa later wrote in a 
report that Togo directed him to attend subsequent councils on his behalf so that 
Hiltebrandt could preside—in accordance with the “circumstances�”63 There is no 
clear explanation for this decision� The editor of Meiji 33 Nen Shinkoku Jihen Kai-
gun Senshishou merely footnotes the dates of promotion of Togo and Hiltebrandt, 
adding the comment “suffice it to mention the fact�”64 One might conjecture that 
Japan sought to avoid an unnecessary confrontation with Russia, that Japan did 
not want the other powers to perceive it as eager to take advantage of the Boxer 
Rebellion to expand its sphere of influence, that the other powers subtly exerted 
pressure to discourage the newcomer from stepping forward, or simply that Japan 
lacked confidence to fulfill the role�
For whatever reason, Japan intentionally avoided taking the initiative in 
this early coalition operation� It was not until 115 years later that a flag of-
ficer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force—the successor to the Imperial 
Japanese Navy—assumed the duty of Commander, Combined Task Force 151, a 
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